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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to descri be an expert 
system which can be used for assisting nuclear power plant 
operators during reactor operation under off-normal condi-
tions. The idea is to use the Rankine cycle representation of 
the plant , to depict cycle states . 
A Rankine cycle interpretation expert system ( RCIES ) has 
been developed which combines the idea of a temperature-entro-
py d i agram ( T-S diagram ) representation of the Rankine cycle 
with the information of the corresponding plant status. The 
interpretation of the information shown by the T-S d i agram 
comes from the expert system. The rule-based shell LEVELS was 
used to write the expert system . 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Role of Computer Technology in Reactor Operations 
Computer systems are playing very important roles in 
nuclear reactor applications. These applications include 
computer programs for reactor operations, fuel management, 
calculating nuclear parameters, etc. 
In order for computer systems to functions as expected, 
hardware and software systems must work correctly. Hardware is 
assumed to include all of the equipment that comprises a 
computer system. Software is the programs that cause the 
computer to do particular tasks. Beside computers which are 
intended to be used for general purpose applications, there 
are a number of computer systems which do specific tasks. For 
instance, there are computer systems to control reactor opera-
tion, computer systems to control traffic operation , etc. 
A branch of computer science that in some sense attempts 
to duplicate human intelligence is called Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI). AI has the capability to emulate human cognitive 
skills such as problem solving, visual conception and language 
understanding. One of the branches of AI is expert systems; 
these are computer programs which attempt to fulfill a func-
tion that normally requires human expertise [1]. An expert 
system displays reasoning power related to a specific domain 
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of knowledge. Provided with certain facts, these programs can 
provide advice, interpret data, etc., to aid operators of 
large complex systems, e.g., nuclear power plants, chemical 
processing plant, etc. Other typical tasks for expert systems 
involve the interpretation of data, diagnosis of faults and 
planning a sequence of actions. 
AI is scarcely younger than conventional programming. The 
earliest attempt to make a computer intelligence was a paper 
presented by Turing in 1963. He proposed a 'Turing test' for 
intelligence. This machine was used to test for the intelli-
gence of a program. The testing was done by giving questions 
to the program and a human at the same time. The questions 
could be any subject from mathematical logic to favorite 
foods, and so on. If the observer could not distinguish that 
the responses come from either source, then it is said that 
the machine shows intelligence. 
The actual development of AI began to be seen shortly 
after World War II. This period of developing AI is called the 
classical period (1). During this early research period an 
idea called state space search was introduced. This approach 
assumes the problems can be formulated as a starting state, a 
termination state and a set of operations. One of the example 
forms of state space search is generate-and-test; it generates 
a possible solution and tests to see if the state is actually 
the solution. The famous algorithms of generate-and-test known 
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as depth-first-search and breadth-first-search are of this 
t ype. One important outcome from this period of expert system 
development is the DENDRAL project. DENDRAL uses a special 
algorithm developed by Lederberg and was implemented in 
INTERLISP [ 2]. It was developed at Stanford University in 
1965. The program determines the molecular structure of an 
unknown organic compound by manipulating symbols that stand 
f or atoms and molecules using a modified form of generate-and-
test. 
The second period of the development of AI is called the 
romantic period [1]. During this period, researchers were 
c oncentrating on trying to make the computer 'understand.' One 
of the leading system was the SHRDLU system by Winograd 
( 1972). The program was capable of understanding English by 
representing and reasoning about a very restricted domain. The 
main outcome of this period was the recognition that expert 
systems do not have to 'understand' a domain in the way that 
humans do to solve problems [3] . 
The modern period [1], which stretches until the present 
day, is denoted by the introduction of specific applications 
of AI. This can be compared to the romantic period where 
people were trying to make very general programs for intelli-
gence systems. The expert system programming technique that 
emerged during this period, includes some important considera-
tions. Firstly, two parts were identified in expert system 
programs, the knowledge base and the inference engine. The 
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knowledge base contains representation of domain-specific 
knowledge. The inference engine is the part of the program 
that performs reasoning. Secondly, it was recognized that 
people should use as uniform a representation of knowledge as 
possible; so it is easier to encode and understand. Thirdly, 
expert systems are expected to off er the user explanation as 
to how the conclusion was achieved. An example of this period 
is the computer program called MYCIN [l]. This program assists 
a physician, who is not an expert in the field of antibiotics, 
with the treatment of blood infections. The work was done by 
collaboration between medical and AI communities at Stanford 
University in 1972. The features of this program are rule-
based, backward-chaining, certainty handling, explanation and 
acquisition. The program generates hypotheses with respect to 
off ending organisms and makes recommendations based on these 
hypotheses. 
A rule-based expert system consists of a set of rules 
that represents the domain knowledge. A rule is a formal way 
o f specifying a recommendation, directive or strategy ex-
pressed as IF premise THEN conclusion or IF condition THEN 
action [2]. When the premise is satisfied by the facts, the 
action specified by the THEN portion is performed. When this 
happens it is said that the rule is fired or executed. 
There are three problem characteristics that serve to 
indicate that an expert system might be used successfully. The 
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first characteristic is ill-structured problems for which 
known algorithms are not available. In this case, the algo-
rithm is not definitely known, as opposed for instance, to a 
standard mathematical formula. The second characteristic is a 
problem in which knowledge availability is in the form of 
loosely defined rules. As an example, consider a situation in 
which a combination of symptoms can lead to a variety of 
accidents, and there is no definite rule to determine which 
specific accident will result. In this case only highly 
trained human expertise can solve the problem. The third 
characteristic is that a data-driven computing-system should 
be able to respond to incoming data from sensors, since 
expert systems are intended to be used in real-world problem. 
In designing an expert system the programmer (referred to 
as a knowledge engineer) interviews the expert to obtain the 
knowledge to be incorporated in the program. This knowledge 
acquisition phase is said to be a 'bottleneck problem', be-
cause it is often difficult for experts to communicate their 
knowledge in a way that is easy to encode in the expert sys-
tem. Buchanan et al., said that knowledge acquisition is the 
transfer and transformation of potential problem-solving 
expertise from some knowledge source to a program [4]. Two 
proposed solutions to the 'bottleneck problem' are machine 
learning and automated knowledge elicitation [ l] . These meth-
ods can replace the interviews between the knowledge engineer 
and the domain expert and produce a similar quality output. 
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B. Description of Nuclear Reactor Systems 
A nuclear reactor is a device where controlled nuclear 
reactions take place. The reactions can be divided into two 
types: fission and fusion reactions. The nuclear fission 
reaction is now economical for the production of electricity. 
There are two widely and economically competitive nuclear 
reactors which are used today to produce electricity. They are 
the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and the Boiling Water 
Reactor (BWR). Both reactors are in the category known as the 
Light Water Reactor (LWR), because they use ordinary light 
water for moderation and coolant. 
The steam cycle is the standard cycle used for generation 
of electrical power. It continues to grow in importance with 
the perfection of nuclear reactor systems, and conventional 
fossil fueled plants. The power cycle used in the LWR can be 
approximated by the Rankine cycle. This cycle is usually shown 
in a temperature-entropy diagram (T-S diagram), which shows 
the secondary cycle of the system for the PWR and the primary 
cycle for the BWR. 
In a BWR, saturated steam is produced in the reactor 
vessel. In the PWR, the liquid in the primary loop is main-
tained at a subcooled state at all time. 
As shown in Figure I.1, a PWR has primary and secondary 
loops. The coolant in the primary loop passes through the 
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reactor core where the energy released in fission is removed 
and transported to the steam generator. Here the energy is 
transferred to the coolant in the secondary loop converti ng it 
to steam. The steam expands through the turbine, is converted 
back to liquid in the condenser, and returned to the steam 
generator. Several stages of feedwater heaters are employed to 
reheat the feedwater . 
Reactor 
. ' .. 1., :1~ Pressun zer 
·1. \ • 
Pressurized 
heated water 
Pump 
Stea.m 
Heat 
e1chanqer 
Feedwater 
Feedwater) 
heaters 
Condenser 
Figure I.1. A simplified diagram of a PWR system [5] 
As seen in Figure I .2 , the Rankine cycle can be used to 
show the processes in both the primary and secondary loops of 
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the PWR. The figure shows the steady state operation at 100 % 
full power. 
Line B-C and the constant pressure bar show the represen-
tation in the primary loop. The pressure bar shows the operat-
ing condition of the pressurizer. The pressurizer consists of 
saturated vapor and saturated liquid. The quality of the 
mixture is denoted by a point A. Point B is the cold leg and 
point c is the hot leg. The small space between the line B-C 
and the saturated liquid line indicates the degree of subcool-
ing of the primary coolant. The vertical space between point A 
and point c indicates the amount of subcooling for the average 
core exit coolant. 
u 
v 
'-
:J 
400 .0 0 
JOO 00 
"§ 200.00 
v 
a. 
E 
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4 00 6.00 
entropy. kJ/(Kg K) 
8 .00 10 00 
Figure I.2. Rankine cycle for primary and secondary loops of 
a PWR 
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The secondary loop of the system is represented by line 
D-E-F-G-H-I; this is the Rankine cycle with no reheat. Line D-
E shows heat addition at constant temperature, converting the 
working fluid from a saturated liquid into saturated vapor. 
Line E-F shows isentropic expansion through the turbine. Line 
F-G shows condensation of the mixture to a saturated liquid. 
Line G-H represents isentropic compression through the pump 
and line H-I represents sensible heat addition from the feed-
water heaters and in the steam generator. 
c. Relevant Research 
There have been a number of expert system applications 
for nuclear power plants. The expert system program is a very 
attractive and promising tool to use in an operator support 
system, because it offers a way of dealing with the informa-
tion overload that can occur during a reactor transient by 
focusing attention on what really matters. Without an expert 
systems, in such conditions the volume of information present-
ed to the operators is such that their decision for correct 
diagnosis of the initiating fault may be delayed. 
Mizumoto et al., suggest that the reactor operators 
should be able to carry on a dialogue using an expert system 
under four modes; explanation, evaluation, hypothetical and 
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guidance modes [ 6 ] . Here the knowledge-based support system 
serves as a framework for diagnosis and decision-making. 
In the human factor area the application of an expert 
system for reactor safety is also very promising. Woods and 
Roth describe several studies related to human factors as they 
pertain to nuclear power plant safety [7] . The physical layout 
of the control room, and an effort to improve the control room 
displays for better performance is the topic of a paper 
presented by Beltracchi [8]. In this paper, Beltracchi 
illustrates the ergonomics of an integrated display, which 
will allow operators to monitor the heat engine cycle during 
normal operation of the plant and the heat removal cycle 
during emergency operation of the plant. Both reports show the 
importance of the human contribution to the safety of reactor 
operation. These reports also suggest a possible role for 
expert systems in the nuclear power plant. Reactor emergency 
response procedures meet one of the characteristics of the 
problems suggest as appropriate for expert systems, that is, 
it is an ill-structured problem. 
A computer program called REACTOR, written by Nelson, is 
an expert system for diagnosis and treatment of nuclear 
reactor accidents [9]. The purpose of this program is to 
monitor a nuclear reactor facility, detect deviations from 
normal operating conditions, determine the significance of the 
situation, and recommend an appropriate response. An interest-
ing feature of this expert system is that the knowledge base 
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consists of two types of knowledge: function-oriented knowledge 
and event-oriented knowledge. Function-oriented knowledge 
concerns the configuration of the reactor system and how its 
components work together to perform a given function. Event-
oriented knowledge describes the expected behavior of the 
reactor under known accident conditions. In compliment to this 
work, another attempt was made using response trees. This tree 
represents knowledge in a fault diagnosis task [10]. 
The REALM computer program is an expert system developed 
by Touchton, which is designed to provide expert assistance in 
the determination of the appropriate emergency status for a 
nuclear power plant [11]. The REALM reasoning process uses 
event-oriented knowledge and symptom-based rules. Event-
oriented knowledge codifies the logic embodied in the tradi-
tional industry Emergency Action Level (EAL). Symptom-based 
rules identify and classify emergency conditions whether or 
not a specific causal event can be found. 
Another important innovation introduced in expert systems 
is the usage of the confidence level or confidence factor. An 
application that uses the confidence level in reactor tran-
sient analysis is the TAMUS computer program [12]. It was 
designed to diagnose reactor transients by analyzing plant 
thermal hydraulic information and correlating it to confidence 
levels and existing emergency nuclear power plant operating 
guidelines. 
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A real-time application of expert systems in reactor 
operation is also desired. The EOPTS computer program was 
developed to assists reactor operators in monitoring and 
carrying out emergency operating procedures during reactor 
transient events and accidents [13). The results show that the 
use of EOPTS can reduce the rate of errors as well as the time 
required for operator responses. 
Underwood developed a computer-based nuclear power plant 
consultant [ 14 ] . The algorithm network model uses a 
commonsense algorithm (CSA) representation. The inference 
procedures interpret the observations and determine whether 
the system is in normal or abnormal conditions. 
D. Objectives of Research 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe the development 
of an expert system which can be used for assisting nuclear 
power plant operators during reactor operation under off-
normal conditions. The idea is to develop an expert system 
that utilizes the Rankine cycle representation of the plant, 
to depict cycle states. 
The basis for this idea comes from the concept presented 
by Beltracchi [8,15,16), in which he suggests that nuclear 
power plant operation can be represented as an iconic display 
on a T-S diagram with the Rankine cycle shown in the diagram. 
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Using the display of the plant cycles on a T-S diagram, an 
operator can determine the status of the power plant at any 
instant in time. 
Although the display is practical for use by the opera-
tor, it requires highly trained personnel to interpret what is 
being shown, since the changing of the iconic display corre-
sponds to different plant conditions. Therefore, the operator 
must know that a given iconic display corresponds to a partic-
ular plant status. 
A Rankine cycle interpretation expert system (RCIES) has 
been developed which combines the idea of the iconic display 
with the information of the corresponding plant status. The 
interpretation of the information comes from the expert sys-
tem. 
The language used in the development of the expert system 
is the LEVELS shell [17) . The LEVELS shell features are rule-
based and backward-chaining. It uses a production rule lan-
guage that has the capability to interface with procedural 
language programs, such as those written in FORTRAN and PAS-
~L. 
E. Overview of Thesis 
This thesis consists of S chapters plus a table, figures, 
appendix and bibliography. Chapter I serves as an introduction 
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of the area of the research, including descriptions of the 
relevant research that has been done and the objectives of the 
research. 
Chapter II discusses the process of knowledge acquisition 
and knowledge representation in an expert system. This chapter 
distinguishes between conventional programming and expert 
systems. The 'bottleneck problem' is discussed in more detail. 
The process of building an expert system using a rule-based 
expert system shell is described. 
Chapter III discusses the LWR system. The emphasis is on 
the PWR system. The discussion relates to the thermal hydrau-
lics processes relevant to nuclear power systems and their 
safety features. 
Chapter IV describes in greater detail the programming of 
RCIES. Early sections of the chapter give some idea of how the 
LEVELS shell works and how it is applied to the objective of 
the research. Later in the chapter, the coupling between the 
iconic display of the T-S diagram with the expert system is 
shown. Sample runs of accidents sequences and illustrations of 
the operator's responses are presented. 
Finally, chapter V summarizes the thesis and notes the 
advantages and disadvantages of RCIES. Some suggestions for 
possible improvement of the program for future work are dis-
cussed. 
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II. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPERT SYSTEMS 
A. Expert Systems Versus Conventional Programs 
In many ways expert systems differ from conventional 
programs. The basic difference is that expert systems manipu-
late knowledge whereas conventional programs manipulate data. 
The conventional programs are designed to produce the correct 
and precise answer every time (an algorithm), while expert 
systems are designed to behave like experts, who sometimes 
produce correct answers and sometimes incorrect answers 
(heuristics). However, when expert systems make mistakes, they 
have the potential to learn from their errors. Unlike expert 
systems, conventional programs are useless if they produce 
incorrect answers , so that the programs must be debugged to 
correct the mistakes. Table II.l summarizes differences be-
tween conventional programs and expert systems. 
Table II .l. The differences between conventional programs and 
expert systems 
Conventional programs Expert systems 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Numeric data 
Algorithmic - exact solution 
Repetitive process 
Effective manipulation of large 
data base 
Symbolic representation 
Heuristic solutions 
Inferential process 
Effective manipulation of 
knowledge base 
--------------------------------------------------------------
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B. The Basic Characteristics of Expert Systems 
Some researchers have a more restricted view of an expert 
system. They define an expert system as a computer program 
that has the properties: expertise, symbolic reasoning, depth 
and self-knowledge [18 ) . 
1. Expertise 
An expert system does not only simply produce good solu-
tions; it must be able to find them effectively and efficient-
ly. The ability to truly mimic a human expert (robustness), 
must also be possessed by an expert system [2]. This is the 
least developed technique in current expert systems. 
2. Symbolic reasoning 
A symbol is a string of characters that stands for some 
real-world concept. For instance: temperature, quality, pres-
sure, etc., are symbols we use to represent thermodynamic 
properties. These symbols can be combined to represent rela-
tionships. Used in this way they represent a symbolic struc-
ture. For instance: 
IF 
AND 
AND 
THEN 
temperature is given 
pressure equals saturated pressure 
quality equals zero 
water is a saturated liquid at that temperature 
Unlike conventional programming, expert systems manipu-
late symbols rather than evaluating standard mathematical 
1 7 
formulas. Therefore it i s i mportant to choose, form, and com-
bine these symbols into usable form . This process is called 
knowledge representation. 
3. Depth 
Expert systems work in the real-world problem domain. 
Therefore, rules in an expert system are usually complicated. 
In this domain, the human expert applies actual data to a 
practical problem and produces solutions that are useful. 
Therefore, an expert system must have a depth; that is, it has 
the ability to handle difficult problem domains and use com-
plex rules [2] . 
4. Self-knowledge 
It is possible to develop an expert system that has the 
ability to examine its own reasoning and explain its opera-
tion . This is knowledge about knowledge, which is defined as 
metaknowledge, and represents knowledge in an expert system 
about how the system operates or reasons (2] . 
Current expert systems have a capability to explain how 
the solution is achieved or have an explanation facility. In 
this explanation facility, the inference chains and reasoning 
rationale are available to the user. 
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c. Knowledge Acquisition 
Knowledge in an expert system may come from many sources, 
such as textbooks, data bases, case studies, reports, etc. 
However, the dominant part of knowledge usually come from the 
human expert. The process of eliciting knowledge from a human 
expert and codifying it is called knowledge acquisition. This 
process involves interaction between the human expert and the 
knowledge engineer. The knowledge engineer interviews the 
human expert. The human expert has in-depth knowledge about 
the problem of interest. Expert systems attempts to model the 
expert's knowledge in a computer program. 
Knowledge engineering is the process of transferring 
knowledge from a human expert to a computer program. The 
person who does this is called a knowledge engineer. This 
person usually has a background in computer science and/ or the 
artificial intelligence field. Special computer programs that 
have features that facilitate the development of expert sys-
tems are referred to as an expert system tool or shell. The 
availability of these tools or shells has made it possible for 
the expert to also serve as a knowledge engineer in some 
cases. 
The activities that the knowledge engineer must carry out 
include: interviewing the experts, organizing the knowledge, 
deciding how it should be represented in the expert system, 
and helping write the code if it is to be done by someone 
1 9 
else. Figure II.l shows steps involved i n the transfer of 
knowledge from the human expert to a c omputer program; this is 
also referred to as knowledge engineeri ng . As illustrated i n 
this figure, the knowledge engineer interviews the human 
expert to gather k nowledge. He or she then produces the knowl -
edge base as a representation of the human expe rt. When some 
rules have been developed, the testing of the expert system 
c an begin. Along with the i nterviewing process, the program i s 
va l idated and revised unti l i t has the ability to solve prob-
l ems in much the same manner as the human experts. 
Q uen". problems 
Answers, solutions 
St r~ttg 1u. 
ruin-of-thumb, 
dom~1n rulu 
Figure II.l. Knowledge engineering (2] 
EXPERT 
SYSTEM 
The acqui sition of knowledge and the structuring o f the 
knowledge into rules has l ong been known as the 'bottl eneck' 
i n e xpert system development. Therefore, as a result of this 
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bottleneck, productivity is poor. It is common to produce 
between two to five production-rule-equivalents per day [l]. 
There are a number of reasons why structuring knowledge 
has been a problem in the development of expert systems [l]: 
1. Human experts have their own language or jargon to 
express their knowledge. This makes it difficult for the 
knowledge engineer to understand the knowledge they are trying 
to grasp. Sometimes, the human experts cannot explain their 
reasoning process. Therefore, the knowledge engineer must 
enrich his or her knowledge about the domain of interest by 
reading textbooks, analyzing case studies, etc., before inter-
viewing the human experts. 
2. The domain of interest cannot be characterized in 
terms of mathematical theory. For instance, suppose that the 
weather today is cloudy, concluding that i t will rain is not 
an exact conclusion. Therefore, this cannot be formulated i nto 
mathematical form. 
3. Experts tend to think in terms of general principles 
of a domain in order to solve problems. Experienced or wel l 
trained human experts usually know their capability very well. 
However, much of their capabilities are i n the form of general 
principles about the domain of interest. For instance, a 
military strategist can explain quickly the weapons possessed 
by the enemy, but he would be less aggressive in answering 
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questions such as which weapons would immediately threaten us 
and which would not. 
4. Finding a good notation for expressing knowledge and a 
good framework for it is itself a hard problem. 
Knowledge acquisition is illustrated in Figure II.2. The 
figure shows the activities which can be represented in five 
stages: identification, conceptualization, formalization, 
implementation and testing [l]. 
Rcdc\1gns 
Rdincmcnls 
t 
ldenury Find co1Kcpn 
Design Formul.Jlc Valida1c 
problem 10 reprcS(nl 
\lruclurc 10 rulesio rules 1ha1 
chuc1ens111:1 Require - know led JC C1>nccp1s 
orJan1zt S1ruc1urc cmOOdv Rules org;in1zt 
men ls knowlcd'c kno.,.lcd-~c knowledge 
IDE~TIFICA TION CONCEPTl'ALIZA TION FORM.~LIZA TION IMPLE~E~T ATIO~ TESTING 
Figure II.2. Stages of a knowledge acquisition [1] 
Identification is the process of characterizing the 
problems of interest and the criteria that solutions must 
meet. Conceptualization is the steps required to uncover the 
key concepts and their relationships, including a characteri-
zation of the different kinds of data, the flow of information 
and the underlying structure of the domain. Formalization 
includes the certainty and completeness of the information, 
22 
and other constraints on the logical interpretation of data, 
such as time dependency, and the reliability and consistency 
of different data sources. Implementation is the steps to 
formalize the knowledge into an executable program. Here one 
is primarily concerned with the specification of control and 
the details of information flow. Testing of expert systems is 
the task to run the program on a large and representative 
sample of test cases. Common sources of error at this point 
are rules which are either missing, incomplete or incorrect. 
Competition between related rules can cause unexpected bugs. 
D. Knowledge Representation 
There are four schemes of knowledge representation used 
( 19]: semantic networks, frames, scripts, and production 
systems. 
Semantic networks are a graphical representation of rela-
tions between elements in a domain where the basic components 
are nodes and links. Nodes are used to represent domain ele-
ments and links are vectors from one node to another. For 
instance, to represent the statement, "control rod is part of 
reactors," the following semantic network can be shown: 
CONTROL ROD ----- partof -----> REACTORS 
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The second scheme is frames, which are a structure for 
organizing knowledge. For example, suppose we know that a 
nuclear reactor consists of nuclear fuel elements, control 
rods, moderator, coolant and undergoes fission reaction. 
Anytime we have these knowledge elements in mind, we expect 
that it is true that they refer to a nuclear reactor. These 
elements are called defining characteristics. Figure II . 3 
shows a frame that provides a partial description of the class 
of objects called REACTOR. 
Frame: REACTOR 
Type: LWR 
Model: PWR 
Fuel: Uranium 
Coolant: Light water 
Moderator: Light water 
Number of Cycle: two loops 
Figure II.3. A reactor frame 
The third scheme is scripts, which is a structure used to 
store prototypes of expected sequences of events. One of the 
applications of scripts is causal-effect relations that estab-
lish a causal chain. For example, consider the following 
actions: (1) Pressure increases; (2) Steam voids collapse; (3) 
Positive reactivity added; (4) Power increases. These activi-
t i es show event (1) caused event (2) caused event (3) and 
ultimately caused event (4). 
The fourth scheme is production systems, which use rules 
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for knowledge representation. Production systems consist of 
working memory, production rules and an interpreter. Examples 
of production systems incl ude OPSS (20) and the LEVELS shell 
[ 1 7 ) • 
Working memory is an area of memory that is used to track 
the current state; it is composed of working memory elements. 
In the working memory, the working memory elements or the 
knowledge bases have been formatted using the syntax of the 
appropriate language used. 
The Production Rule (PRL) language used in the LEVELS 
shell consists of the condition portion, that is sometimes 
called the left hand side (LHS) portion and the action por-
tion, that is sometimes called the right hand side (RHS) 
portion. The LHS consists of condition elements that describe 
the premise that must be true for the rule to be applicable. 
The RHS describes the action that must be taken when the rule 
fires. 
The interpreter or inference engine recognizes and exe-
c utes a production whose LHS has been satisfied. To recognize 
a pplicable rules, the interpreter compares the LHS with the 
current state of the working memory, this activity is called a 
reasoning process. The following section discusses the rule-
based programming in more detail. 
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E. Rule-based Programming in Expert Systems 
Rule-based programming is another way to represent knowl-
edge in an expert systems. In rule-based programming, there 
are two kinds of systems or strategies that can be used; 
backward-chaining systems and forward-chaining systems. Back-
ward-chaining systems sometimes are also called top-down 
systems. Forward-chaining systems are also sometimes called 
bottom-top systems. 
Backward-chaining systems work by starting from the 
ultimate goal and breaking down the goal into subgoals. This 
means, in order for the program to work, one ultimate goal 
must be stated first, and the program then tries to satisfy 
the goal by firing the appropriate rules that lead to the 
ultimate goal. This type of system is an appropriate applica-
tion particularly for diagnosis. 
Forward-chaining systems, on the other hand, work from 
initial conditions that are known; the current state of knowl-
edge then is used to make a chain of inferences until a goal 
is reached or a solution is unattainable. 
The LEVELS shell used in this research is an example of a 
production rule language which uses either backward-chaining 
or forward-chaining. LEVELS is an advanced development envi-
ronment and delivery vehicle for expert systems [17]. The 
LEVELS system overview is shown in Figure II.4. 
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The advantages of LEVELS shell are: 
1. It has the capability to activate other LEVELS knowl-
edge bases and to communicate with them via a file or global 
facts or shared parameters. 
2. It allows external programs to be activated directly 
by a knowledge base and provides an interface to dBASE II and 
dBASE III data files. 
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Figure II.4. The LEVELS system overview [17] 
Figure II.5 shows an example of rules, using the LEVELS 
shell syntax and a backward-chaining system, to determine the 
current status of a reactor power plant as the goal. The facts 
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given are for the normal conditions of a PWR type reactor 
using design parameters given in reference (21]. 
Rule 
IF 
AND 
THEN 
for determining primary coolant status 
Hot leg pressure greater than saturated pressure 1 
Cold leg pressure greater than saturated pressure 2 
primary coolant is in subcooled region 
Rule for normal operation 
IF primary coolant is in subcooled region 
THEN primary coolant is in normal condition 
Rule 
IF 
AND 
THEN 
Rule 
IF 
ANO 
AND 
THEN 
Rule 
IF 
AND 
THEN 
Rule 
IF 
THEN 
Rule 
IF 
AND 
AND 
AND 
THEN 
Rule 
IF 
AND 
THEN 
for determining S/ G status 
S/ G outlet pressure equals saturated pressure 3 
S/G outlet quality equals one 
S/G outlet is in saturated vapor line 
for determining turbine status 
Turbine outlet pressure equals saturated pressure 4 
Turbine outlet quality greater than zero 
Turbine outlet quality less than one 
Turbine outlet is in mixture region 
for determining condenser status 
Condenser outlet pressure equals saturated pressure 4 
Condenser outlet quality equals zero 
Condenser outlet is in saturated liquid line 
for determining f eedwater pump status 
Feedwater pump outlet pressure greater than saturated 
pressure 4 
Feedwater pump outlet is in subcooled region 
for normal operation 
S/G outlet is in saturated vapor line 
Turbine outlet is in mixture region 
Condenser outlet is in saturated liquid line 
Feedwater pump outlet is in subcooled region 
Secondary coolant is in normal condition 
for steady state operation 
primary coolant is in normal condition 
secondary coolant is in normal condition 
reactor is operating in steady state operation 
Figure II.5. Rules for current status of power plant 
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III. THERMODYNAMIC ASPECTS IN LIGHT WATER REACTORS 
A. Characteristics of Some Thermodynamic Systems 
Thermodynamics is used to analyze systems involving 
energy transfer. The systems usually contain some working 
substance, in a liquid or a gas phase, which flows or circu-
lates through the components. One of the valuable method of 
analysis is to use a T-S diagram for systems that undergo a 
cyclic process. 
The Carnot cycle is an idealized cycle that is based on 
principle that no engine can produce more work for the same 
amount of heat added and the same heat source and sink temper-
ature than one operating on a reversible cycle [ 5 ] . Since in 
the Carnot cycle, the temperature difference between the heat 
source and the fluid during heat addition or between the fluid 
and the heat sink during heat rejection is zero, this cycle 
c annot be applied in an actual system. For instance, i n the 
a c tual cycle like the PWR systems there is a temperature 
difference during heat addition and heat rejection in the heat 
exchanger. A practical approximation to the Carnot cycle is 
the Rankine cycle. 
The Rankine cycle can be used to approximate the power 
c ycle used in the LWR which receives most of its heat and 
re j ects all of its heat at constant temperature. The 
u 
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thermal efficiency of the Rankine cycle is less than the 
thermal efficiency of the Carnot cycle, because of the fact 
that there are temperature differences between the source and 
sink and the working fluid. 
Figure III.! shows the T-S diagram for the Carnot cycle. 
It consists of four reversible processes: two processes of 
isothermal heat addition and heat rejection (1-2, 3-4), isen-
tropic expansion and isentropic compression (2-3, 4-1). The 
i nternally reversible Rankine cycle is shown in Figure III.2. 
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Figure III.!. T-S diagram with the Carnot cycle 
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Figure III.2. Internally reversible Rankine cycle 
Modern power plants produce superheated steam to improve 
efficiency and reduce moisture in the turbine. Reheat of the 
working fluid is also used between turbine stages to reduce 
the moisture content of the steam. The Babcock & Wilcox PWR 
systems uses superheated steam (22] . 
The Rankine cycle can be used to describe the plant 
10.00 
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conditions for PWR system as well as for BWR system. In BWR, 
the T-S diagram only shows one cycle, the direct cycle, in 
which the boiling core is shown in place of the steam 
generator in PWR. The use of superheat can also be shown in 
the T-S diagram. Therefore, the B & W type of PWR system may 
also be represented by the Rankine cycle. 
The expert system RCIES described in this thesis is 
restricted at this time to the Westinghouse PWR system. 
B. Boiling Water Reactor 
1. Flow diagram 
The boiling water reactor (BWR) is a nuclear power plant 
which boils water in the reactor vessel. The saturated vapor 
produced is used to drive the turbine. This type of cycle is a 
direct cycle. Figure III.3 shows the flow diagram of a BWR. 
Water is circulated through the reactor core, producing 
saturated steam. Heat produced by the fission reaction in the 
core is used to boil the water. The steam produced carries 
some liquid which is separated from the vapor by a separator 
and a dryer. The steam then goes to the turbine. The turbine 
consists of two stages, a high pressure (HP) turbine and two 
low pressure (LP) turbines. Before the steam enters the LP 
turbines it is separated from the water content and reheated. 
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The turbines operate the turbogenerator and produce electrici-
ty. Most of the steam from the turbines flows through the 
condenser, where it is converted to a saturated liquid. The 
condensate pump, pumps the condensed water through demineral-
izers and feedwater heaters. The feedwater pump increases the 
pressure of the coolant to the level in the reactor vessel . 
SflAM 
.... , ... , _/ 
Figure III.3. Flow diagram of BWR ( 23] 
The jet pump recirculation system is used to circulate 
the required coolant through the reactor core and to control 
the steam void content of the core. It provides forced 
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circulation flow. This system controls the reactor power 
through the negative void coefficient. 
2 . Primary process systems 
The jet pump system mentioned in the previous section is 
located in the main recirculation system within the reactor 
vessel. This system is used to control the flow through the 
reactor core. Figure III.4 shows the jet pump recirculation 
systems. 
100-..flilT 
1 SO~Tioi. 
VAL.VI 
Figure III.4. The jet pump recirculation flow [23] 
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The primary process systems are used during normal reac-
tor operation. The system consists of the main recirculation 
system, the main steam lines, and the feedwater system. The 
purpose of the primary process systems is to supply steam to 
the turbine and feed water to the reactor and to cool the 
reactor core. 
The purpose of the main steam lines is to carry steam 
from the reactor to the turbine. There are two isolation 
valves (internal and external) to close the reactor contain-
ment penetration. The internal isolation valves will close and 
interrupt the outlet steam flow if there is a pipe break 
outside the containment. The external isolation valves will 
close and isolate the reactor if there is a pipe break inside 
the containment. Besides these valves, there are safety/ relief 
valves on each line outside of the reactor vessel. These 
valves provide protection against overpressure of the reactor 
primary system. 
The f eedwater system carries water from the condenser to 
the reactor vessel. The water usually is in a subcooled state, 
therefore, it is at high pressure. This high pressure is 
generated by the feedwater pumps. In the system, there are 
internal and external isolation valves. 
The internal isolation valves are check valves, because 
the water flow is controlled automatically to maintain the 
water level constant. The external isolation valves are power-
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operated, and are operationally controlled in the main control 
room. 
3. Emergency core cooling systems 
Besides the system functions required for the reactor 
during normal condition, there is a system which is used when 
accidental loss of coolant occurs in the reactor. These sys-
tems are called the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), and 
are used to keep the reactor core cooled in the event of such 
an accident. 
The primary objective of the ECCS is to prevent fuel 
cladding failure for any mechanical failure, including the 
severance of the largest pipe in the plant. This prevention is 
very important because the release of radioactive materials 
must not take place during the most severe accident that can 
happen in the reactor. 
c. Pressurized Water Reactor 
1. Flow diagram 
The pressurized water reactor (PWR) is a nuclear power 
plant which uses ordinary light water as moderation and cool-
ant. The water is maintained in a subcooled state while in the 
core, therefore the pressure in the reactor must be greater 
than the saturated pressure corresponding to the given temper-
3 6 
ature. Figure III.5 shows a schematic diagram of the PWR sys-
tern. 
t 
n ,.. 
-
Figure III.5. Schematic diagram of PWR system [ 24] 
2 . Functional description 
This type of reactor uses a dual cyc le; a primary l oop 
and a secondary loop. The water is heated as it flows through 
the reactor and gives off its energy to the secondary loop 
through thin-wall tubes in the steam generator. The secondary 
l oop, which is at a lower pressure than the primary loop, 
produces steam to drive the turbine-generator. 
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The reactor vessel contains the coolant, nuclear fuel 
assemblies, and control rods. The control rods control the 
nuclear fission rate and provide an instantaneous shutdown 
capability . The water coolant increases in temperature as it 
flows through the core in direct proportion to the reactor 
power level. 
The steam generator transfers thermal energy from the 
reactor to the turbine steam system. Therefore, the steam 
generator consists of two main parts, a primary side and a 
secondary side. Spent steam from the turbine is condensed by 
the condenser and pre-heated prior to returning to the steam 
generator. The steam generator level is controlled automati-
cally to ensure a reactor heat sink and to prevent moisture 
carry over that could damage the turbine blading. The steam 
flow, pressure, and steam generator level are always monitored 
to ensure heat sink integrity. When the values of these param-
eters exceed the design restriction, safety actions are auto-
matically initiated. 
The pressurizer provides an expansion volume for the 
primary system coolant and controls primary system pressure. 
The fluid in the pressurizer is at the saturation temperature 
for the given system pressure. Pressure in the pressurizer is 
maintained by a combination of electric heaters and spray from 
the primary system cold leg. Therefore, the pressurizer acts 
as the surge tank. 
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The expansion of reactor coolant i nc reases the water 
level of the pressurizer, and raises the press ure of the 
pressurizer. At this point , the pressurizer is experiencing 
i nsurge flow. In order to decrease the pressure to design 
pressure, the spray from the primary coolant cold leg is 
actuated. 
When electrical load demand increases, it will result in 
a temporary decrease in average c oolant temperature and cool -
ant volume is decreased. The water in the pressurizer then 
flows out into the primary loop. At this point, the pressuriz -
er is experiencing outsurge flow , thus reducing the pressuriz-
er level and pressure. When the water level is near the lowest 
allowable level (approximately above the electric heater), the 
electri c heater is turned on to limit the pressure reduction. 
When the pressure increase is beyond the capabil i ty of 
the pressurizer spray system, the relief valves open. The 
s team from the relief valves flows through the pipe to the 
pressurizer relief tank. 
D. Safety Aspects in Light Water Reactors 
The main objective of reactor safety considerations is to 
pr event radioactive release to the environment. The current 
LWRs have been proven to be operationally safe for more than 
30 years. The basic philosophy o f safety i ncorporates three 
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criteria : fail-safe designs, multiple barriers, and multiple 
and redundant systems . 
The fa i l-safe designs means that if there is a failure, 
the emergency system must be able to shut the reactor down ( if 
necessary) in a fail-safe manner. For example, if there is 
power failure, magnetic c ontact is lost and the rods fa l l by 
gravity back into the core, shutting down the reactor safely. 
Nuclear power reactors usually have four barriers : f uel, 
cladding, reactor vessel, and containment vessel. The first 
innermost is the fuel, which tends to holds the fission 
products . The fuel cladding is designed to withstand tempera-
ture rise so that the fuel would not melt. The reactor vessel, 
whi ch is the third barrier, is again used to prevent release 
of radioactive contamination to the environment. The c ontain-
ment vessel will serve to keep the radioactive substance 
i nside should the other system fail. 
A variety of safety systems are used, each of which 
operates differently for different reactor c onditions. For 
e xample, there are safety i njection systems, recirculation 
systems, etc. Redundancy i s the concept that a system has a 
backup or standby system. For example, there are two or more 
motor-operated valves to control flow. In this example, two or 
more motor-operated valves f unction and the rest of the valves 
remai n in standby and should be able to operate when the 
current valves fails to open or close when they are needed. 
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IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RANKINE CYCLE 
INTERPRETATION EXPERT SYSTEMS (RCIES) 
A. Knowledge Acquisition and Representation 
RCIES was designed using the LEVELS shell which uses the 
backward-chaining system. The knowledge in RCIES was gathered 
by interviewing the expert [ 26,27], case studies, and NRC 
reports [28]. The basic concept of the design is to utilize 
the Rankine cycle to depict the cycle state. The parameters 
needed to construct the expert systems describe the following 
processes: sensible heat addition, boiling water to generate 
steam, expansion and turbine work, heat rejection with conden-
sation of steam to water, and compression of water by means of 
a pump. 
To be more specific, the information needed are the 
temperature and pressure in each subsystem of the Rankine 
cycle. A modified set of subroutines, originally called QUAL 
[ 29 ] , has been used to calculate the thermodynamic parameters, 
such as entropy. The subroutines were modified so that they 
may be used to calculate the parameters needed for RCIES. 
The output of QUAL is used to construct the Rankine cycle 
in the T-S diagram. The diagram is displayed by using the 
package program called VIEW [30]. The program is a two-dimen-
sional graphic program, which has the capability to enlarge or 
reduce the scale of the diagram shown. Both programs, QUAL and 
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VIEW, are incorporated in RCIES . Therefore, the control of 
processes are within the expert system. 
Figure IV.1 shows the block diagram of the whole process-
es of RCIES. The program has the capability to simulate abnor-
mal events and emergency events in the PWR operations (West-
inghouse type) . 
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Figure IV.1. Block diagram of RCIES 
Figure IV.1 shows the first rules in the knowledge base 
activate an external program called QUAL, which solves the 
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thermodynamics equations of state for the coolant properties, 
given the temperature and pressure of each coolant loop in the 
system. QUAL obtains these input data f rom a file or from the 
plant sensors in actual application. This information is then 
used by the knowledge base to infer the plant coolant condi-
tions. 
Another external program called VIEW is also interfaced 
with the RCIES. This pac kage generates a plot file and dis-
plays the T-S diagram on the computer screen. The expert 
system informs the user of the plant conditions and uses the 
T-S diagram as part of the explanation of the inference of the 
plant status. The user is then prompted to indicate if he/ she 
wishes to continue or to terminate the analysis. During an 
actual event, RCIES would continue to receive changing input 
data and would continually inform the operator of the changing 
plant status. As an example of how RCIES activates an external 
program, Figure IV.2 shows the rules to active QUAL. 
RULE 
ACTIVATE 
DISK 
SEND 
SEND 
RETURN 
RETURN 
RETURN 
RETURN 
THEN 
to activate access the thermodynamics data 
c: \ prl\QUAL.EXE 
c:\prl\paramkb.dat 
temperatures and pressures of the primary loop 
temperatures and pressures of the secondary loop 
temperatures and pressures of the primary loop 
entropies of the primary loop 
temperatures and pressures of the secondary loop 
entropies of the secondary loop 
the thermodynamics properties have been determined 
Figure IV.2. Rule to active the external program QUAL 
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A more detailed block diagram of RCIES is shown in Figure 
IV.3. In this figure RCIES consists of a main program and the 
chain to the other programs. The CHAIN command of LEVELS is 
then used to access the other knowledge base of interest. With 
this function, a knowledge base of virtually limitless size 
can be created, therefore any number of events can be added to 
RCIES. 
The first program chained to RCIES is the knowledge base 
related to the simulation of the emergency event consisting of 
a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR). RCIES determines the 
event and gives step by step advice to the operators to secure 
the reactor. The second knowledge base chained to RCIES is 
simulation of the abnormal events that might occur in the 
pressurizer, such as loss of automatic pressurizer pressure 
control (LOAPPC), and failure of spray valve to close ( FOPSV ) . 
The other knowledge bases chained to RCIES are simulations of 
other emergency events such as feedwater line break, steam 
line break, and a small loss of coolant accident. However, 
since there is not adequate information for these knowledge 
bases, they have not been fully developed at this time. When 
such information is available, RCIES may be modified easily by 
incorporation of the appropriate chain commands and logic. 
The discussions of the states represented by SGTR, PZR 
knowledge bases can be found in the discussions of 
implementation of RCIES. The SGTR knowledge base is the knowl-
edge base that simulate the emergency event in the steam 
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generator . The PZR knowledge base contains two abnormal 
events, LOAPPC and FOPSV. A complete source codes listing of 
RCIES can be found in the appendix of this thesis. 
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Figure IV.3. A detailed block diagram of RCIES 
45 
B. Implementation of RCIES 
When the reactor operates at normal c ondition, RCIES will 
inform the operators by mentioning that the current status is 
normal and no action is necessary. In the T-S diagram, all 
parameters are within the design limit , the Rankine cycle c an 
be i llustrated by examini ng Figure IV.4. Following the sugges-
tion of Beltracchi, the processes taki ng place in the sub-
cooled region of the T-S diagram are shown on an enlarged 
scale so changes of state are more readily apparent to the 
user. 
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Figure IV.4. Reactor parameters are within the design limit 
46 
In the event of a steam generator tube rupture, informa-
tion for developing the knowledge base is taken from the 
accident that took place in the R.E . Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 
on January 25, 1982 [31] and NRC reports [28] . These published 
sources are in effect the "expert" for this event. In order to 
determine that there is a rupture in the steam generator, the 
following rule, as seen in Figure IV.5, is constructed. 
RULE 
IF 
AND 
AND 
AND 
THEN 
for steam generator tube rupture 
Pressurizer level = decreasing 
Pressurizer pressure = decreasing 
Volume control tank level = decreasing 
Steam generator blowdown activity = increasing 
steam generator tube rupture 
Figure IV.5. Steam generator tube rupture rule 
This rule shows that when such symptoms occur, it is 
likely that a tube rupture in the steam generator has taken 
place. Based on this conclusion, RCIES gives step by step 
actions needed for the operator to bring the reactor into a 
safe condition. The actions are divided into four phase 
events. The ultimate goal would be to isolate the faulted 
steam generator. 
In the T-S diagram, such an accident can be illustrated 
by indicating that the primary and pressurizer pressures are 
falling (corresponding to a lower temperature), as illustrated 
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in Figure IV. 6 . This event is illustrated as the first phase 
event. 
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Figure IV.6 . The primary and pressurizer pressures are falling 
Figure I V. 6 indicates that the hot l eg and cold leg 
temperature difference is lower than the one in Figure I V.4. 
The pressure bar or the pressurizer pressure is also lower. 
Figure IV.7 shows the second phase event; the temperature 
rise across the reactor c oolant system ( RCS ) is minimum, 
because the reactor has been tripped and full coolant flow 
rate exists. The steam in the turbine is approaching the 
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saturated vapor line. The action to trip the reactor was 
necessary since the operator has found out that there has been 
a leakage in the steam generator. This action followed by 
injecting safety coolant into the reactor will prevent the 
reactor core from becoming dry of water. Therefore, the water 
level can be increased, and fuel melt can also be prevented. 
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Figure IV.7. The pressure of RCS is minimum 
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Following the reactor trip, the primary pumps are also 
tripped. This action increases the temperature rise in the 
reactor coolant which helps establish natural circulati on. 
Figure IV.8 shows this condition. This is categorized as the 
third phase event. 
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Figure IV.8. The plant status after the pri mary pumps have 
been tripped 
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Finally, the fourth phase event shows that the faulted 
steam generator has been isolated and the temperature of the 
coolant has been raised. At this time, the reactor is in 
secure condition, as seen in Figure IV.9. From this point, the 
required mechanical work should be done by the technician to 
take care of the faulted steam generator. 
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Figure IV.9. The faulted steam generator is isolated 
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In abnormal events, such as ''failure of spray valve to 
close" and "loss of automatic pressurizer pressure control," 
the symptoms are seen in the pressurizer level and pressure. 
The pressurizer experiences either insurge or outsurge flows. 
The information to construct this knowledge base comes from 
NUREG-1291 (28) and interviews with the expert (27,28). 
The insurge and outsurge flows are not emergency events, 
since the condition of the reactor can be returned to normal 
\ if the operators take the right actions and/or the control 
instruments function properly. 
One simulation of abnormality in the pressurizer is the 
failure of the spray valve to close (FOPSV). When the pressur-
izer experiences an outsurge flow, the water level is de-
creased and the pressurizer pressure is decreased as well. The 
electric heaters should be energized to increase the pressure. 
The spray valve will open to reduce the pressure when the 
pressure rise, caused by the electric heaters, is beyond the 
design limit. However, in this scenario, it remains open. 
Therefore, the pressurizer pressure is decreasing below the 
design limit. The necessary action to be taken by the operator 
is to select an alternate channel to close the spray valve or 
manually close the spray valve and electric heater should be 
energized. If the spray valve remains open, then the reactor 
should be tripped and an emergency event declared. The emer-
gency response procedure should be followed. Figure IV.10 
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shows the rules pertaining to the failure of the pressurizer 
spray valve to close. The ultimate goal is to go to a normal 
plant status. 
RULE for operator's response 
IF outsurge flow 
AND spray valve = open 
THEN transient determined 
RULE for operator's response 
IF transient determined 
AND select alternate channel = verified 
AND heaters energized = verified 
THEN status normal 
RULE for operator's response 
IF transient determined 
AND select alternate channel = not verified 
AND control valve manually = verified 
AND heaters energized = verified 
THEN status normal 
RULE for operator's response 
IF transient determined 
AND select alternate channel = not verified 
AND control valve manually = not verified 
AND spray valve = open 
AND trip the reactor = verified 
AND trip the coolant pump = verified 
THEN emergency response procedure 
Figure IV.10. Rules for failure of spray valve to close 
The first rule of Figure IV.10 determines that the pres-
surizer is experiencing an outsurge flow with the spray valve 
remaining open. The T-S diagram of this status is shown in 
Figure IV.11. The figure shows that the pressurizer pressure 
is very low. The hot leg and the cold leg status are less 
subcooled than the one illustrated in Figure IV.4. 
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Since the second rule of Figure I V.10 shows that an 
alternate channel could be activated, the spray valve is 
closed automatically. The T-S diagram after this action is the 
same as Fi gure I V.4. 
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Fi gure IV.11. The T-S diagram for spray valve remains open 
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The third rule of Figure IV.10 shows that neither auto-
matic nor manual action to close the spray valve was success-
ful, therefore at this point the pressurizer pressure keeps 
decreasing and the emergency response procedure should be 
followed. The T-S diagram of this condition is shown in Figure 
IV.12. 
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Figure IV.12. The pressurizer pressure and level are very low 
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In Figure IV.12 the pressurizer pressure is very low, 
because the water sprayed from the spray valve, which comes 
from the cold leg of the primary systems, keeps decreasing the 
temperature in the pressurizer. Therefore, the pressurizer 
pressure is very low. The hot leg of the primary systems could 
become saturated liquid. This condition is not desired, be-
cause the coolant in the primary system should be maintained 
in the subcooled region. This effect means that the reactor 
coolant could experience boiling. 
Another abnormal event simulated by RCIES is the loss of 
automatic pressurizer pressure control ( LOAPPC). The simula-
tion is for the case of an insurge flow. During the insurge 
flow, the water level and pressure are increasing. The neces-
sary action to bring the plant back to the design value is to 
open the spray valve, followed by energizing the electric 
heater to bring the liquid water to saturation. If the spray 
valve cannot help to prevent the pressure increase, the power 
operated relief valve (PORV) should open, so that the steam 
can flow to the pressurizer relief tank. Figure IV.13 i llus-
trates the rules that are used to simulate this transient. 
The first rule of this abnormal event shows that there is 
an insurge flow taking place in the pressurizer. Therefore, 
the pressure and level are increasing. The necessary action is 
to open the spray valve in order to reduce the pressurizer 
pressure. 
5 6 
In this simulation, the electric heater remains off and 
the PORV remains closed. Therefore there is no pressurizer 
pressure control function in this abnormal event. RCIES would 
help the operators take the required actions to bring the 
reactor into normal condition. 
RULE 
IF 
AND 
AND 
AND 
THEN 
RULE 
IF 
AND 
THEN 
RULE 
IF 
AND 
AND 
THEN 
RULE 
IF 
AND 
THEN 
for operator's response 
insurge flow 
spray valve = open 
heaters energized = not verified 
power operated relief valve = not verified 
transient determined 
for operator's response 
transient determined 
heaters energized = verified 
status normal 
for operator's response 
transient determined 
heaters energized = not verified 
power operated relief valve = not verified 
loappc determined 
for operator's response 
loappc determined 
power operated relief valve = 
status normal 
verified 
Figure IV.13. Rules for loss of automatic pressurizer pressure 
control 
The second rule on Figure IV.13 shows that the electric 
heaters have been energized, this causes some volume of the 
liquid water to become saturated. Therefore, the pressurizer 
level and pressure are decreasing to stay within the design 
limit. The T-S diagram of this condition is the same as in 
Figure IV.4. 
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In the fourth rule, the PORV has been opened. This condi-
tion brings the pressurizer pressure down to meet the design 
limitation. Therefore, the presurizer now is operating at 
normal condition or plant status is normal. 
The T-S diagram showing that the pressurizer pressure or 
pressure bar is increasing beyond the design limit is illus-
trated in Figure IV.14. This figure determines the status of 
the plant as the first rule in Figure IV .2 fired. 
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Figure IV.14. The pressure bar is increasing 
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V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
A. Conclusion of the Research 
The RCIES computer program has been developed using the 
LEVEL5 shell. The program has the capability to simulate 
emergency events and abnormal events related to the plant 
thermodynamics processes that might take place in a Westing-
house type PWR. To demonstrate the concept of RCIES, a steam 
generator tube rupture was selected as the emergency event 
simulated by the program . Pressurizer transients consisting of 
the loss of automatic pressurizer pressure control and the 
failure of the pressurizer spray valve to close, were selected 
as the abnormal events that are simulated by the program. More 
events can be added to RCIES using the LEVEL5 chain function 
as more knowledge bases about other events can be constructed. 
RCIES uses a backward-chaining system, and it chains to 
other knowledge bases to guide the responses that the opera-
tors must make. It was demonstrated that RCIES also can incor-
porate external software package programs, such as VIEW to 
display the Rankine cycle on the T-S diagram. The thermodynam-
ic properties are calculated using the subroutine QUAL. 
The program works in a cycle when the current session is 
completed. The user has the option to continue or to terminate 
the cycle. In actual practice, the program may be connected to 
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plant sensors to receive the necessary input from the plant. 
During the session, the program asks the user or the operator 
about the parameters needed to derive the conclusion. The user 
may respond by providing qualitative answer, such as pressure 
is decreasing or increasing. Therefore, the decision about the 
conditions of the plant still relies on the operator. 
Since the operators are guided to specific information, 
they are helped to focus on what really matters during the 
current status of the plant. With the help of the Rankine 
cycle display and verbal information about the display, the 
operator should have insight as to where the reactor stands at 
a given instant in time. 
The main disadvantage of RCIES is that the program does 
not function in a real-time basis. Therefore, the information 
load is delayed. With the use of real-time programming tech-
niques, such a delay may be avoided. 
B. Suggesti ons for Future Work 
The program can be further developed by adding some more 
emergency or abnormal events to the program. This addition 
should be easy because of the chaining function capability of 
LEVELS shell. 
A better graph program that has the capability to display 
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APPENDIX - THE RCIES SOURCE CODES LISTING 
RCIES.PRL 
TITLE rankine cycle interpretation expert system 
The RCIES program, Rankine cycle Interpretation Expert 
System, is an expert system which interprets the Rankine 
cycle to determine the current status of PWR power plant 
- Westinghouse type -
Written by Yudi u. Imardjoko 
Iowa state University 
Department of Mechanical Engineering 
Nuclear Engineering Program 
Ames, Iowa 
$ SHARED.PRL 
FORGET ALL 
1. goal achieved 
! 
1991 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
! Rule for achieving ultimate goal 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
RULE for pursuing the goal 
IF small loca inside containment 
OR small loca outside containment 
OR steam break inside containment 
OR steam break outside containment 
OR f eedwater break inside containment 
OR f eedwater break outside containment 
OR steam generator tube rupture 
OR outsurge flow 
OR insurge flow 
OR status normal 
THEN goal achieved 
AND CYCLE 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
! Rule for normal operation ! 
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!-------------------------------------------------------------
RULE for normal operation 
IF Taverage = normal 
AND Reactor coolant system pressure = normal 
AND Pressurizer level = normal 
AND Volume control tank level = normal 
AND Containment pressure = normal 
AND Containment temperature = normal 
AND Containment humidity = normal 
AND containment airborne radiation = normal 
AND Steam flow = normal 
AND Steam pressure = normal 
AND Feedwater flow = normal 
AND Steam generator level = normal 
AND steam generator blowdown activity = normal 
THEN status normal 
AND DISPLAY 1 
AND ACTIVATE c: \ prl\normal.bat 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
! Rules to determine the emergency events ! 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
RULE for small LOCA inside containment 
IF Reactor coolant system pressure = decreasing 
AND Pressurizer level = decreasing 
AND Volume control tank level = decreasing 
AND containment pressure = increasing 
AND Containment temperature = increasing 
AND containment humidity = increasing 
AND Containment airborne radiation = increasing 
THEN small loca inside containment 
AND DISPLAY 2 
AND CHAIN SLIC 
RULE for small LOCA outside containment 
IF Reactor coolant system pressure = decreasing 
AND Pressurizer level = decreasing 
AND Volume control tank level = decreasing 
AND Containment airborne radiation = increasing 
THEN small loca outside containment 
AND DISPLAY 3 
AND CHAIN SLOC 
RULE for steam break inside containment 
IF Taverage = decreasing 
AND Reactor coolant system pressure = decreasing 
AND Pressurizer level = decreasing 
AND Volume control tank level = decreasing 
AND Containment pressure = increasing 
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AND Containment temperature = increasing 
AND Containment humidity = increasing 
AND steam flow = increasing 
AND steam pressure = decreasing 
AND Feedwater flow = increasing 
AND Steam generator level = decreasing 
THEN steam break inside containment 
AND DISPLAY 4 
AND CHAIN SBIC 
RULE for steam break outside containment 
IF Taverage = decreasing 
AND Reactor coolant system pressure = decreasing 
AND Pressurizer level = decreasing 
AND Volume control tank level = decreasing 
AND Steam flow = increasing 
AND Steam pressure = decreasing 
AND Feedwater flow = increasing 
AND steam generator level = decreasing 
THEN steam break outside containment 
AND DISPLAY 5 
AND CHAIN SBOC 
RULE for f eedwater break inside containment 
IF Taverage = decreasing 
AND Reactor coolant system pressure = decreasing 
AND Pressurizer level = qecreasing 
AND Volume control tank level = decreasing 
AND Containment pressure = increasing 
AND containment temperature = increasing 
AND Containment humidity = increasing 
AND Steam flow = increasing 
AND Steam pressure = decreasing 
AND Feedwater flow = decreasing 
AND Steam generator level = decreasing 
THEN f eedwater break inside containment 
AND DISPLAY 6 
AND CHAIN FBIC 
RULE for f eedwater break outside containment 
IF Feedwater flow = decreasing 
AND Steam generator level = decreasing 
THEN f eedwater break outside containment 
AND DISPLAY 7 
AND CHAIN FBOC 
RULE for steam generator tube rupture 
IF Pressurizer level = decreasing 
AND Pressurizer pressure = decreasing 
AND Volume control tank level = decreasing 
AND Steam generator blowdown activity = increasing 
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THEN steam generator tube rupture 
AND DISPLAY 8 
AND CHAIN SGTR 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
! Rules for abnormal events 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
RULE for failure of pressurizer spray valve 
IF Pressurizer pressure = decreasing 
AND Pressurizer level = decreasing 
THEN outsurge flow 
AND FORGET Pressurizer pressure 
AND FORGET Pressurizer level 
AND DISPLAY 9 
AND CHAIN PZR 
RULE for loss of automatic pressurizer pressure control 
IF Pressurizer pressure = increasing 
AND Pressurizer level = increasing 
THEN insurge flow 
! 
AND FORGET Pressurizer pressure 
AND FORGET pressurizer level 
AND DISPLAY 10 
AND CHAIN PZR 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
TEXT Taverage 
How is the average temperature across the coolant? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Reactor coolant system pressure 
How is the reactor coolant system pressure? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Pressurizer level 
How is pressurizer level? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Volume control tank level 
How is volume control tank level? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Containment pressure 
How is containment pressure? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
6 8 
TEXT Containment temperature 
How is containment temperature? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Containment humidity 
How is containment humidity? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Containment airborne radiation 
How is containment airborne radiation? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Steam flow 
How is the steam flow? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Steam pressure 
How is the steam pressure? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Feedwater flow 
How is the f eedwater flow? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Steam generator level 
How is the steam generator level? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Steam generator blowdown activity 
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How is the steam generator blowdown activity? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
TEXT Pressurizer pressure 
How is the pressurizer pressure? 
- normal 
- increasing 
- decreasing 
DISPLAY 1 
I.l'U"lU"ll''lJ'J.Jl"ln.l'U"lU"ll''lJ'J.Jl"ll'l..l'U"lU"ll''lJ'J.J:'lrJ..l'U"lll'll'11'11~1'U'J.ru':U'l.l''lJ'J.Jl"ll'l..l'U"lll'll'11'11~l"U"lll'll'U"U"U-i.l'U'J.ru':U'll'l 
Status 
Action 
normal operation 
none 
press function key 2 to show the T-S diagram 
press function key 10 to end the session 
DISPLAY 2 
IMM~[M)jlMJo00.fMllofMJ"4MMMMJ4~DOOOOO.fMllofMJ'4Ml"4MMMMJ4~DOIMlo00i{M]lfMl"4MMMMMMM 
State 
Indication: 
off-normal operation 
small L o c A 
Location 
Status 
inside containment 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Taverage 
Reactor coolant system pressure 
Pressurizer level 
Volume control tank level 
Containment pressure 
Containment temperature 
Containment humidity 
Containment airborne radiation 
Steam flow 
steam pressure 
Feedwater flow 
Steam generator 
Steam generator 
level 
blowdown activity 
normal 
decreasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
increasing 
increasing 
increas ing 
increasing 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
press function key number 2 now ........ . 
DISPLAY 3 
IMJollM1ofMJMMMJollM1ifMJMMMJollMJifM]!ofM)(JjlMJifM]!(MM'Jil!M)(M]lifMM)41MJilMJlifMM)4!)01MJifM]!ofM)(JjlMJofMM; 
State 
Indication: 
Location 
Status 
off-normal operation 
small LOCA 
outside containment 
1. Taverage normal 
70 
2. Reactor coolant system pressure 
3 . Pressurizer level 
4. Volume control tank level 
5. Containment pressure 
6. Containment temperature 
7. Containment humidity 
8. Containment airborne radiation 
9. Steam flow 
10. Steam pressure 
11. Feedwater flow 
12. Steam generator level 
13. Steam generator blowdown activity 
decreasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
press function key number 2 now ........ . 
DISPLAY 4 
In.rll'U'U'1'l'ln.ru"~U~L'ln~~·ll'U-u-..nn.ru"u-u'~~<-.n.ru•~~~M·~~.-.n~'ll'U~~•u·•~~-;~~~~•u~ru•~~-u~~ 
State 
Indication: 
off-normal operation 
steam break 
Location 
Status 
inside containment 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Taverage 
Reactor coolant system pressure 
Pressurizer level 
Volume control tank level 
Containment pressure 
Containment temperature 
Containment humidity 
Containment airborne radiation 
Steam flow 
steam pressure 
Feedwater flow 
Steam generator level 
Steam generator blowdown activity 
decreasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
increasing 
increasing 
increasing 
normal 
increasing 
decreasing 
increasing 
decreasing 
normal 
press function key number 2 now ........ . 
DISPLAY 5 
IMMMMJ!ilMJIO{}fM1'1M!i!!MMMMMMl!ifMJIO{}fM1'no!!MMMMl!ilMJIO{}fM1'no!!MMMMMMl!ilMJIO{}~!MMM 
state 
Indication: 
off-normal operation 
steam break 
Location 
Status 
outside containment 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4. 
5. 
Taverage 
Reactor coolant system pressure 
Pressurizer level 
Volume control tank level 
Containment pressure 
6. Containment temperature 
decreasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
normal 
normal 
71 
7. Containment humidity 
8. Containment airborne radiation 
9. Steam flow 
10. Steam pressure 
11. Feedwater flow 
1 2. Steam generator level 
13. Steam generator blowdown activity 
normal 
normal 
increasing 
decreasing 
increasing 
decreasing 
normal 
press function key number 2 now •... • .... 
DISPLAY 6 
Iru'~~·u~•~~r"'~~·~,'"~r=~~·~·'"~·~~~·:iru=~l'l..l~.ri..r.,~·.......,cu~~LrLru~.~·'"~~·u~~~·~~~u-~u~ 
State 
Indication: 
off-normal operation 
f eedwater break 
inside containment Location 
Status 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
5 . 
6. 
7 . 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Taverage 
Reactor coolant system pressure 
Pressurizer level 
Volume control tank level 
Containment pressure 
Containment temperature 
Containment humidity 
Containment airborne radiation 
Steam flow 
Steam pressure 
Feedwater flow 
Steam generator 
Steam generator 
level 
blowdown activity 
decreasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
increasing 
increasing 
increasing 
normal 
increasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
decreasing 
normal 
press function key number 2 now .•..• . ... 
DISPLAY 7 
IMMMMl~o!Mfi~lMM[MMHMMMJ~o!Mfi~IM14MMMMl~o!Mfi~IMJ4[MMMMMMJ~o!Mfi~[MMM 
State 
Indication: 
off-normal operation 
f eedwater break 
outside containment Location 
Status 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8 . 
9 . 
10. 
11. 
Taverage 
Reactor coolant system pressure 
Pressurizer level 
Volume control tank level 
Containment pressure 
Containment temperature 
Containment humidity 
Containment airborne radiation 
Steam flow 
Steam pressure 
Feedwater flow 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
decreasing 
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12. Steam generator level 
13. Steam generator blowdown activity 
decreasing 
normal 
press function key number 2 now ........ . 
DISPLAY 8 
IMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMlMMlMMlMMlli!Mlli!MlofM!ofM!OOOOOOfM!ifM!ilM}llM}llM}l~!MM 
State 
Indication: 
off-normal operation 
steam generator tube rupture 
Steam generator Location 
Status 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Taverage 
Reactor coolant system pressure 
Pressurizer level 
Volume control tank level 
Containment pressure 
Containment temperature 
Containment humidity 
Containment airborne radiation 
Steam flow 
Steam pressure 
Feedwater flow 
Steam generator 
Steam generator 
level 
blowdown activity 
normal 
normal 
decreasing 
decreasing 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
normal 
increasing 
press function key number 2 now ........ . 
DISPLAY 9 
IMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMlMMJMMJMMlli!Mlli!Mlli!Mlli!MlofM!ofM!ofM!ofM!OOfM!i!MM 
State off-normal operation 
Indication: Pressurizer 
Status 
2. Pressurizer pressure 
3. Pressurizer level 
decreasing 
decreasing 
press function key number 2 now ........ . 
DISPLAY 10 
IMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMlMMl!ilMl!ilMll(M]l(M]l(M]lifMllifMllifMllifMllifMllifMlDODOI; 
END 
State off-normal operation 
Indication: Pressurizer 
Status 
2. Pressurizer level 
3. Pressurizer pressure 
increasing 
increasing 
press function key number 2 now ........ . 
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SGTR.PRL 
TITLE steam generator tube rupture 
! 
$ SHARED . PRL 
FORGET ALL 
1 . steam generator tube rupture verified 
! 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
! rules for operator's action necessary pertaining to the S/ G! 
! accident ! 
!-------------------------------------------------------------
RULE for responses due to steam generator tube rupture 
IF steam generator tube rupture 
THEN action needed 
RULE for responses due to steam generator tube rupture 
IF action needed 
THEN accident has been determined 
AND DISPLAY 9 
AND ACTIVATE c:\prl\sgtr2.bat 
RULE for responses due to steam generator tube rupture 
IF accident has been determined 
AND safety Injection Flow = verified 
AND isolate faulted steam generator = verified 
THEN next action needed 
RULE for responses due to steam generator tube rupture 
IF next action needed 
THEN initial actions have been determined 
AND DISPLAY 10 
AND ACTIVATE c:\prl\sgtr3.bat 
RULE for responses due to steam generator tube rupture 
IF initial actions have been determined 
AND level in affected steam generator = verified 
AND Isolate all feed to affected steam generator = verified 
AND Close pressurizer PORV's = verified 
THEN more action needed 
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RULE for responses due to steam generator tube rupture 
IF more action needed 
THEN final actions have been accomplished 
AND DISPLAY 11 
AND ACTIVATE c: \ prl\sgtr4.bat 
RULE for responses due to steam generator tube rupture 
IF final actions have been accomplished 
AND Reset Safety Injection = verified 
AND Cooldown Reactor Coolant System = verified 
AND Establish pressurizer level = verified 
AND Terminate Safety Injection Flow = verified 
AND Establish normal charging = verified 
AND Verify pressurizer level = verified 
AND Establish normal makeup to VCT = verified 
AND Establish normal letdown = verified 
AND Secure diesel generators = verified 
AND Verify if leakage rate is minimized = verified 
AND Ensure subcriticality = verified 
THEN steam generator tube rupture verified 
AND DISPLAY 12 
AND ACTIVATE C:\PRL\SGTR5.bat 
AND FORGET ALL 
AND CHAIN RCIES 
TEXT Safety Injection Flow 
Verify the safety injection flow and then stop reactor coolant 
pump ! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT isolate faulted steam generator 
Isolate faulted steam generator! 
action necessary = 
- close HSIV 
- close PORV 
- blowdown 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT level in affected steam generator 
Verify level in affected steam generator! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Isolate all feed to affected steam generator 
Isolate all feed to affected steam generator! 
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- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Close pressurizer PORV's 
Close pressurizer power operated relief valves ! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Reset Safety Injection 
Reset safety injection! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Cooldown Reactor Coolant System 
Verify cooldown reactor coolant system! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Establish pressurizer level 
Check pressurizer level ! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Terminate Safety Injection Flow 
Terminate safety injection f l ow ! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Establish normal charging 
Establish normal charging! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Verify pressurizer level 
Check pressurizer level! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Establish normal makeup to VCT 
Establish normal makeup to volume control tank! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Establish normal letdown 
Establish normal letdown! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Secure diesel generators 
Secure diesel generators ! 
- verified 
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- not verified 
TEXT Verify if leakage rate is minimized 
Verify if leakage rate is minimized! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT Ensure subcriticality 
Verify to ensure subcriticality! 
- verified 
- not verified 
DISPLAY 9 
I·~~l<'>.l"ll~~~:'ll'Lrll"l.rir:~~'ll"ll"ll'Ul'll'l.r~LrU.·~,~=~l'll~~~~u=~u~~•·J..nru~~~.~~u~·u·~•·u~ru~~u·• 
Primary pressure is falling 
Pressurizer pressure and level are decreasing 
press function key 2 to show the T-S diagram 
DISPLAY 10 
IMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMIMMIMMlMMl!ilMJ!ilMJ~~iOOiOODDDDDDnfi.IM1'IMJLllM}llMM 
The temperature rise across the core is very small, 
because of the reactor trip and full coolant flow 
LMMMMMIMJollM1'DflolMJ~MMMMMM[M}LllMJllM1DflolMJ~MMMMMMMM[M}LllMJollM1'DflolMJ~MMMMMMM9 
press function key 2 to show the T-S diagram 
DISPLAY 11 
IMMMMMMlMMl'4Ml~lfM!DDDODD'~IMMMMMMMMl'4Ml~lfM!DODD'~IMMMMMMMMMMl!oD!M; 
The temperature of the coolant has been raised, this 
helps to establish natural circulation . 
The affected steam generator has been isolated 
press function key 2 to show the T-S diagram 
DISPLAY 12 
IMMl!ilMl-IM1'1M1'!MMMMl~IQOIM1'!!MMMMl~4'.M)jCMMMMJ~~IMMtMMMMl~4'.M)jCMMMMJ~lfM; 
END 
Status 
1. The affected steam generator has been isolated 
2. Pressure difference at primary/ secondary loop 
is minimum 
3. Reactor coolant system cooldown has commenced 
4. Subcooling is being maintained 
Action : none 
press function key 2 for new input 
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PZR.PRL 
TITLE abnormality in pressurizer system 
$ SHARED.PRL 
FORGET ALL 
1. abnormality in pressurizer solved 
'-------------------------------------------------
! Rules for failure of pressurizer spray valve 
!-------------------------------------------------
RULE for operator's response 
IF outsurge flow 
THEN outsurge flow determined 
AND DISPLAY 1 
AND ACTIVATE c:\prl\fopsv2.bat 
RULE for operator's response 
IF outsurge flow determined 
AND spray valve = open 
THEN f opsv determined 
AND DISPLAY 2 
AND ACTIVATE c:\prl\fopsv3.bat 
RULE for operator's response 
IF f opsv determined 
AND select alternate channel = verified 
AND heaters energized = verified 
AND pressurizer pressure = normal 
THEN abnormality in pressurizer solved 
AND DISPLAY 3 
AND ACTIVATE c:\prl\normal.bat 
AND FORGET ALL 
AND CHAIN RCIES 
RULE for operator's response 
IF f opsv determined 
AND select alternate channel = not verified 
AND control valve manually = verified 
AND spray valve = closed 
AND heaters energized = verified 
AND pressurizer pressure = normal 
THEN abnormality in pressurizer solved 
AND DISPLAY 3 
AND ACTIVATE c:\prl\normal.bat 
AND FORGET ALL 
7 8 
AND CHAIN RCIES 
RULE for operator's response 
IF f opsv determined 
AND select alternate channel = not verified 
AND control valve manually = verified 
AND spray valve = open 
AND trip reactor = verified 
AND trip reactor coolant pump = verified 
AND safety injection = verified 
THEN emergency operating procedure 
AND abnormality in pressurizer solved 
AND DISPLAY 4 
AND ACTIVATE c: \ prl\ fopsv4.bat 
AND FORGET ALL 
AND CHAIN RCIES 
!-------------------------------------------------
! loss of automatic pressurizer pressure control ! 
!-------------------------------------------------
RULE for operator's response 
IF insurge flow 
AND spray valve = open 
AND heaters energized = not verified 
AND power operated relief valve = not verified 
THEN insurge flow determined 
AND DISPLAY 5 
AND ACTIVATE c: \ prl \ loappc2.bat 
RULE for operator's response 
IF insurge flow determined 
AND heaters energized = verified 
THEN abnormality in pressurizer solved 
AND DISPLAY 3 
AND FORGET ALL 
AND ACTIVATE c:\prl\normal.bat 
AND CHAIN RCIEs 
RULE for operator's response 
IF insurge flow determined 
AND power operated relief valve = open 
THEN abnormality in pressurizer solved 
AND DISPLAY 3 
AND FORGET ALL 
AND ACTIVATE c: \ prl\ normal .bat 
AND CHAIN RCIES 
TEXT Pressurizer pressure 
c heck to see the pressurizer pressure! 
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- normal 
- abnormal 
TEXT Pressurizer level 
check to see the pressurizer level! 
- normal 
- abnormal 
TEXT spray valve 
Check to see if the spray valve remains open or closed! 
- open 
- closed 
TEXT power operated relief valve 
Check to see if the power operated relief valve is open or 
closed! 
- open 
- closed 
TEXT select alternate channel 
Select alternate channel to control the valve! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT control valve manually 
Control spray valve mauanlly! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT spray valve 
Check to see if the spray valve has been open or closed! 
- open 
- closed 
TEXT heaters energized 
Check to see if the heaters has been energized! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT trip reactor 
Since the spray valve cannot be closed, trip the reactor now! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT trip reactor coolant pump 
Following the trip of the reactor, then trip the reactor 
coolant pump! 
- verified 
- not verified 
TEXT safety injection 
80 
The plant is in emergency condition, verify safety injection! 
- verified 
- not verified 
DISPLAY 1 
IMM~l'MJlllO~Ofll.fMlMMMMMJ.4'Mf.ll'MJlllODOOOOfllofMl~MMMMMM'MJ.l!M1'1lOOOOfliolMJto!M 
Pressurizer pressure and level are low 
press function key 2 to show the T-S diagram 
DISPLAY 2 
IMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMlMMlMMlMMl!ilMJ!ilMJ!ilMJ!ilMJi!M!i!M!DDDDIM1'1M1'1M 
Pressurizer pressure starts increasing 
press function key 2 to show the T-S diagram 
DISPLAY 3 
I~ll"llrll"ll'll'"ll'l..IC"U"Ll~•.r=ll'Ll·u~:"ll"JJl'l.l~CJ.rJ=rc~~u-u"U""~l'l.l~~~'U'"l<rU'~~~CU"~l~•~u·J~~~··u~.~• 
Plant at steady state 
failed valve has been manually closed 
LMMMMMHMlHMlHMlMMlMMlMMlMMlMMlMMl!ilMJ!ilMJi!M!DDDDIM1'GGGGl!Ol!OIMJ.llMJ.llM1'1lM1'1r.M9 
press function key 2 to show the T-S diagram 
DISPLAY 4 
IMMMMJ!(MJDDDU-DO!IMMMMMMJ!(MJDIJo(M}jlMM[MMMMJ!(MJDIJo(M)jlMM[MMMMJ!(MJDIJoDU-IM 
Please ref er to emergency response procedure for 
safety injection 
press function key 2 to show the T-S diagram 
DISPLAY 5 
IMMMMHMlMMlMMllfMJODODfM!-{MJojlMMIMMMMMMlMMlMMlODDDfM!-{MJoj{MJoj!MMIMMMMMMM 
Pressurizer pressure and level are high 
press function key 2 to show the T-S diagram 
END 
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SLIC.PRL 
TITLE small loca inside containment 
$ SHARED.PRL 
FORGET ALL 
1. small loca inside containment verified 
RULE 
IF 
THEN 
AND 
END 
for responses due 
small loca inside 
small loca inside 
CHAIN RCIES 
to small loca inside containment 
containment 
containment verified 
82 
SLOC . PRL 
TITLE small loca outside containment 
$ SHARED.PRL 
FORGET ALL 
1. small loca outside containment verified 
RULE for responses due to small loca outside containment 
IF small loca outside containment 
THEN small loca outside containment verified 
AND CHAIN RCIES 
END 
83 
SBIC.PRL 
TITLE steam break inside containment 
$ SHARED.PRL 
FORGET ALL 
1. steam break inside containment verified 
RULE for responses due to steam break inside containment 
IF steam break inside containment 
THEN steam break inside containment verified 
AND CHAIN RCIES 
END 
84 
SBOC.PRL 
TITLE steam break outside containment 
$ SHARED . PRL 
FORGET ALL 
1. steam break outside containment verified 
RULE for responses due to steam break outside containment 
IF steam break outside containment 
THEN steam break outside containment verified 
ANn CHAIN RCIES 
END 
85 
FBIC.PRL 
TITLE f eedwater break inside containment 
$ SHARED.PRL 
FORGET ALL 
1. feedwater break inside containment verified 
RULE for responses due to f eedwater break inside containment 
IF f eedwater break inside containment 
THEN feedwater break inside containment verified 
AND CHAIN RCIES 
END 
86 
FBOC.PRL 
TITLE f eedwater break outside containment 
$ SHARED.PRL 
FORGET ALL 
1. feedwater break outside containment verified 
RULE for responses due to f eedwater break outside containment 
IF f eedwater break outside containment 
THEN feedwater break outside containment verified 
AND CHAIN RCIES 
END 
87 
SHARED.PRL 
SHARED STRING Taverage 
AND STRING Reactor coolant system pressure 
AND STRING Pressurizer level 
AND STRING Pressurizer pressure 
AND STRING Volume control tank level 
AND STRING Containment pressure 
AND STRING Containment temperature 
AND STRING Containment humidity 
AND STRING Containment airborne radiation 
AND STRING Steam flow 
AND STRING Steam pressure 
AND STRING Feedwater flow 
AND STRING Steam generator level 
AND STRING Steam generator blowdown activity 
'-----------------------------------------
! shared facts for major severe accident ! 
!-----------------------------------------
! 
SHARED SIMPLEFACT status normal 
AND SIMPLEFACT small loca inside containment 
AND SIMPLEFACT small loca outside containment 
AND SIMPLEFACT steam break inside containment 
AND SIMPLEFACT steam break outside containment 
AND SIMPLEFACT f eedwater break inside containment 
AND SIMPLEFACT f eedwater break outside containment 
AND SIMPLEFACT steam generator tube rupture 
AND SIMPLEFACT outsurge flow 
AND SIMPLEFACT insurge flow 
!-----------------------------------
! Shared string for sgtr responses ! 
!-----------------------------------
SHARED STRING Safety Injection Flow 
AND STRING Isolate faulted steam generator 
AND STRING Level in affected steam generator 
AND STRING Isolate all feed to affected steam generator 
AND STRING Close pressurizer PORV's 
AND STRING Reset Safety Injection 
AND STRING Cooldown Reactor Coolant system 
AND STRING Establish pressurizer level 
AND STRING Terminate Safety Injection Flow 
AND STRING Establish normal charging 
AND STRING Verify pressurizer level 
AND STRING Establish normal makeup to VCT 
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AND STRING Establish normal letdown 
AND STRING Secure diesel generators 
AND STRING Verify if leakage rate is minimized 
AND STRING Ensure su.bcriticality 
!------------------------------------
! Shared string for pressurizer 
!------------------------------------
SHARED STRING spray valve 
AND STRING select alternate channel 
AND STRING safety injection 
AND STRING control valve manually 
AND STRING heaters energized 
AND STRING trip reactor 
AND STRING trip reactor coolant pump 
AND STRING power operated relief valve 
